Marginalizing experience: A critical analysis of public discourse surrounding stem cell research in Australia (2005-6). by Lysaght, T et al.
Lysaght, Little & Kerridge (2011), Journal of Bioethical Inquiry. 8(2):191-202. Post-review copy. 
 
1 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in [J Bioethical Inquiry] on 22 Mar 2011, available online 
at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11673-011-9294-2  
 
Self-archived in the Sydney eScholarship Repository by the Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine 
(VELiM), University of Sydney, Australia 
 
Please cite as: 
Lysaght T, Little JM, Kerridge I. Marginalizing experience: A critical analysis of the public discourse surrounding 
stem cell research in Australia (2005-6). J Bioethical Inquiry. 2011;8(2):191-202. 
 
Marginalizing experience: A critical analysis of public discourse 
surrounding stem cell research in Australia 
Dr. Tamra Lysaght 
Research Fellow, Centre for Biomedical Ethics 
National University of Singapore, Singapore 117597 
Professor Emeritus Miles Little 
Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine 
University of Sydney, Sydney NSW 2050 
A/Professor Ian Kerridge 
Director of the Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine 
University of Sydney, Sydney NSW 2050 
Bone Marrow Transplant Physician, Haematology Department 
Royal North Shore Hospital, Sydney NSW 2065 
 
This study was conducted in accordance with approvals obtained from the University of Sydney’s 
Human Research Ethics Committee and carried out under the auspices of a Premier Postgraduate 
Scholarship at the Australian Stem Cell Centre. During this study, one of the authors (IK) served as a 
member of the Legislative Review Committee appointed to review Australia’s federal legislation 
governing the use of human embryos in research and human cloning. We would like to thank Rachel 
Ankeny from the University of Adelaide, who co-supervised the project and made valuable 
contributions to the study. We also acknowledge the support of staff and students at the Centre for 
Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine and the generous time given by the interview participants.  
The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare and all have played a substantive role in writing 
the manuscript. 
Keywords:   Stem cells, Cloning, Bioethics, Public policy 
Abstract: 
Over the past decade, stem cell science has generated considerable public and political 
debate. These debates tend to focus on issues concerning the protection of nascent human 
life and the need to generate medical and therapeutic treatments for the sick and 
vulnerable. The framing of the public debate around these issues not only dichotomises and 
oversimplifies the issues at stake, but tends to marginalise certain types of voices, such as 
the women who donate their eggs and/or embryos to stem cell research and the patients 
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who might benefit from its potential clinical outcomes. This paper draws on empirical 
research conducted on a recent stem cell policy episode in Australia. From the qualitative 
examination of 109 newspaper opinion editorials and 23 in-depth interviews, it is argued 
that these voices are marginalised because they are based on discourses that have less 
epistemological status in public debate. Our results suggest that the personal experiences of 
women and patients are marginalised by the alliances that form between more powerful 
discourse communities and use science as a source of authority and legitimation. It is 
argued that members of these communities establish legitimacy and assert authority in 
public debate by discursively deploying science in claims that marginalise other 
epistemologies. Implications are discussed along with suggestions for a more enriched and 
inclusive public debate. 
 
Introduction 
From the late 1990s when human embryonic stem cell (ESC) lines were first isolated from 
human blastocysts and mammals were first cloned using a technique known as somatic cell 
nuclear transfer (SCNT), many governments around the world have implemented legislation 
to regulate ESC research and SCNT. While there is great variation between, and sometimes 
within, different countries with respect to its permissibility, there is also a high degree of 
uniformity in the regulations that govern stem cell research internationally (Hauskeller 
2005). Generally speaking, regulatory regimes across nations are developed according to 
discourses that place priorities on either the welfare of human embryos or the duty to care 
for the sick and vulnerable (Banchoff, 2005; Gottweis, 2002). Where ESC research is 
permitted, it is typically under strict conditions that require informed consent from embryo 
and/or oocyte donors (Waldby and Salter 2008). 
In 2002, the Australian Federal Parliament enacted a nationally consistent legislative 
framework that prohibited the use of SCNT for any purpose and only allowed research on 
supernumerary IVF (in-vitro fertilisation) embryos created prior to April 2002 (Nicol, 
Chalmers, and Gogarty 2002). A three-year review built into this legislation was carried out 
by an independent legislative review committee (called the LRC) between 2005 and 2006. 
The amendment act that followed allowed for the continued use of IVF embryos but 
permitted the creation of SCNT embryos for research purposes while maintaining the 
prohibition on human reproductive cloning (Cooper 2006).  
The 2005-6 policy episode attracted considerable media attention and, as with stem cell 
debates elsewhere (Nisbet, Brossard, and Kroepsch 2003; Parry 2003), the Australian media 
has tended to frame the public debate around issues relating to the moral status of human 
embryos and potential utility of stem cells (Robins 2005). This framing has dichotomised and 
oversimplified the social, moral and political issues at stake and has tended to marginalise 
certain types of voices from the debate (Williams, Kitzinger, and Henderson 2003; Ganchoff 
2004), particularly the women who donate their eggs and/or embryos to stem cell research 
and the patients who might benefit from its potential clinical outcomes (Parry 2003; 
Williams, Kitzinger, and Henderson 2003; Goggin and Newell 2004). 
While the personal narratives and stories of patients often have tremendous emotional 
power in science policy debates, they seldom have the status afforded to other types of 
evidence such as scientific data and are often excluded at the point that policy or legislation 
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is developed (Kleinman and Kleinman 1997, 1-24; Epstein 2000, 15-32). In this paper, we 
examine the power and legitimacy around different ‘voices’ in the stem cell debate through 
the claims participants used throughout the 2005-6 Australian policy episode. 
Theoretical Approach: Public Debate as a ‘Focused Discourse’ 
For this examination, we adopted a theoretical approach described by Little (2010) that 
views public debates around science policy issues as a Type 2 focused discourse. According 
to Little (2010), this type of discourse occurs in response to an event or affair that is of 
sufficient political, social and/or cultural import that it reaches the broader communicative 
field of the public sphere. This public discourse is composed of multiple, heterogeneous 
communities that coalesce around particular issues. Members of these discourse 
communities share certain values, commitments and ideological beliefs about the issue in 
question, which manifest in the ‘discourse rules’, or lexicon of words they use in public 
discourse (Little, Jordens, and Sayers 2003). After the issue subsides, these communities 
usually disperse, although they may reform again as policy events re-emerge in the public 
domain and transform into an ongoing affair (Little and Lipworth 2007, 10). The public policy 
issues surrounding stem cell research are events that have developed into an ongoing affair 
in public discourse as governments continue to consider the regulation and possible 
prohibition of techniques used in this research.  
The Structure of Public Discourse 
Public discourses occur within forums that are relatively open and accessible to practically 
anyone who is interested in a particular issue (Habermas 1989, 27). Forums for public 
discourse include traditional sources such as the mass media, parliamentary debates, public 
hearings and inquiries as well as new electronic media (e.g. the Internet). Access to these 
forums is theoretically open to anyone with the capacity to read a newspaper, watch 
television or use a computer that has online access. In practice, however, participation in 
public discourse is limited by many context-bound restrictions. 
Public discourses are created and sustained through legitimation processes that accredit 
speakers with credibility and authority (Derrida 2003, 93). These processes shape the 
content, structure and dynamics of public discourse by restricting access to those who are 
allowed to speak for and on behalf of prevailing social institutions (Van Dijk 1996, 84-86). In 
science policy contexts, powerful institutions (such as governments, the media, science, the 
judiciary and organised religion) compete for authority to frame and define the rules of 
engagement. These rules limit the possible outcomes of policy disputes by defining how 
issues are framed and by prescribing the types of claims that are considered as valid and 
legitimate forms of argument. 
As the most persuasive form of argumentation, participants use rhetoric as an effective 
means of communicating in public discourse (Tupasela 2007). The use of rhetoric reflects 
the values, beliefs and opinions of participants and when no other means of legitimation are 
available, participants in public discourse around science policy may establish credibility and 
legitimacy by rhetorically adopting the norms, values and ideals of accredited discourse 
communities (Gamson 1990). Accreditation of discourse communities is negotiated 
between and within the prevalent social structures of established institutions (Limoges 
1993). The institutionalised legitimacy and authority of participants, therefore, not only 
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restricts access to those who are empowered to speak in public discourse, it also 
characterises the content, structure and dynamics of science policy disputes. 
Science policy disputes manifest in public discourse when decisions concerning the 
governance of scientific research and its technological applications are contested by those 
with competing interests in the outcomes of a policy decision. Of the different types of 
disputes that arise in public discourse, the most relevant to this study are those contested 
on the basis of what are portrayed as value-conflicts in first principles (Mooney 2001, 4). In 
such instances, the usual technical and economic considerations of science policymaking are 
superseded by other political, social and moral concerns (Nowotny 1993). These concerns 
are vocalised in rhetorically-based arguments that not only question scientific practice, but 
challenge the basic norms and values that justify the research (Nelkin 1995, 447-448). The 
types of claims participants use to support their arguments can, therefore, provide 
important information about the moral norms and social values that are contested in 
science policy disputes.  
Claims that are made about science are thus discursive acts that manifest as statements in 
the talk (or text) of participants in public discourse. A ‘science claim’ is one that discursively 
appeals to the authority of science to support the claim. These claims contain statements 
about scientific knowledge that participants present in support of their arguments and imply 
meanings that vary according to the context in which they are used and by whom. This 
essay examines how these claims were used by participants in the Australian 2005-06 stem 
cell policy debate. 
Methods 
Two sources of evidence were examined in this study: 1) opinion editorials that were 
published in Australian newspapers; and 2) in-depth interviews with informants who 
participated in the public discourse throughout the 2005-6 stem cell policy dispute. 
Newspaper opinion editorials (‘op-eds’) were chosen partly because the mass media is the 
most accessible and dominant source for tracking public discourse (Kennamer 1992, 6-9). 
This same method has been used in similar studies (e.g. Nisbet, Brossard, and Kroepsch 
2003; Kitzinger and Williams 2005; Williams, Kitzinger, and Henderson 2003). More 
importantly, op-eds were chosen because authors are explicitly invited to express 
prescriptive views (Bell 1991, 13). In this way, op-eds are very different to news items, 
which according to our theoretical frame, are a specialist media discourse. News media 
discourses embody certain norms, values and perspectives that reflect the discourses 
communities of the journalists, editors and/or organisations that produce them (Gans 1979, 
39-52; Shoemaker and Reese 1996, 82-103). While these values will, to some extent, be 
reflected in the editorial decisions made in publishing the op-eds of one contributor over 
another, news items were excluded from the analysis because this study was not concerned 
with analysing media discourse (i.e. this study was not a media analysis).  
Many other forums for public discourse exist and have frequently been included in other 
similar studies, particularly formal policy documents (e.g. Mulkay 1997; Parry 2003; 
Banchoff 2005; Gottweis 2002). However, while parliamentary debates and public inquiries 
are generally held within public forums that are, also according to our theoretical frame, 
specialist ‘policy’ discourses. And while Internet sources such as web blogs and posts are 
public discourses they were not chosen for study because the identity and interests of 
speakers is often unclear. For these reasons, we examined op-eds published between 
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January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2006 from two nationally distributed newspapers and 
twelve major metropolitan newspapers using the Factiva database. The total number of op-
eds examined was 109. 
As has been done in other studies (e.g. Ganchoff 2004; Wainwright et al. 2006), in-depth 
interviews were included in order to capture a more contextualised and richer account of 
the public discourse than afforded by the op-ed texts and to better understand why certain 
claims were used and not others. Twenty-three interviewees were selected using purposive 
sampling techniques (Merriam 1988, 76-84) from an initial sampling frame of op-ed 
contributors, which was later expanded to include informants from the official public 
inquiries. Interviewees were selected according to their self-declared interest group (i.e. 
scientists, policymakers, religious groups etc) in order to capture a broad range of voices in 
the public debate. All interviews were recorded using a digital recorder and transcribed for 
analysis.  
Texts from both sources were examined qualitatively using content and thematic analysis 
techniques to identify participants and examine their use of science claims. Science claims 
were defined as discursive acts that appeal to the authority of science. It was assumed these 
claims would vary according to the interests and commitments of participants when used to 
support a policy position1. Participants were categorised as either advocating or opposing 
the liberalisation of Australia’s existing legislation governing stem cell research. Of the fifty-
six participants identified as op-ed contributors, twenty-six were categorised as policy 
advocates and twenty-five as policy opponents. The position of five contributors was 
unclear. Of the twenty-three interviewees, fourteen advocated the policy proposal while 
nine were opposed. 
Both datasets were analysed for themes relating to the legitimacy and authority of science 
and expertise and the use of rhetoric in public discourse. Rhetoric was identified in 
statements containing tools and devices commonly applied in discourses of science (e.g. 
Gross 1996; Waddell 1997; Prelli 1997; Mulkay 1997). Deference to, and contempt for, 
science or technical expertise were regarded as an appeal to authority, and legitimation 
processes were captured in statements participants used to establish legitimacy for their 
position and/or diminish the authority of others. Participants’ personal and professional 
interests were also examined for any inconsistencies between their declared commitments 
and their use of science claims in the public debate. Results of the op-eds are presented first 
                                                 
1
 We do not assume that the interests and commitments of participants are fixed and do not change over time or 
develop as the debate progresses or changes direction as new information emerges. We do, however, assume 
that participants generally enter these debates with pre-formed views about what issues are important and about 
how they would prefer to see the policy episode resolved and that these views generally reflect their interests. 
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followed by the interviews2 and discussed with respect to the relevant literature under the 
following headings. 
The Authority of Science, Expertise and Marginalisation in Stem Cell Policy Debates 
The results of this examination revealed that the public discourse surrounding the 
Australian stem cell debate was replete with claims that appealed to the authority of 
science. These claims implied meanings and values that varied according to the stated policy 
position of participants and were used discursively to achieve a desired moral outcome. For 
example, the comparable meanings of SCNT and IVF embryos, and the rhetoric used to 
convey those meanings, was associated with the different moral arguments participants 
used to support their position. As seen in this op-ed statement, rhetorical devices were used 
in comparing SCNT embryos with other types of objects known to lack moral status: 
…the committee ultimately concluded that embryos created in this way have a different moral status 
from those formed from an egg and a sperm by a couple trying to have a baby. Where an embryo is 
formed to produce stem cells compatible with the person whose body cell is used, that is more akin 
to growing skin cells for a skin graft than to having a baby and there are fewer objections to creating 
an embryo for the purpose of using its cells in research and treatment. [Loane Skene] The Melbourne 
Herald Sun 
The simile in this statement made by Professor Loane Skene, who co-chaired the LRC, makes 
clear that the moral status of SCNT embryos is “more akin” to that of human tissues, rather 
than to whole human beings. In support of this ontological claim, Skene appealed to the 
authority of science to imply that ‘cells’ not created from the fusion of an egg and sperm for 
the purposes of reproduction have less moral status. SCNT embryos, therefore, were 
dehumanised in a discursive process that shifted the focus away from questions regarding 
their moral status onto the technical issue of whether these are “just” cells or viable 
embryos (Parry 2003; Williams, Kitzinger, and Henderson 2003).  
Opponents of ESC/SCNT research employed similar processes in their claims. For example, 
opponents often argued that there were no differences between embryos created for 
research and reproductive purposes. At the same time, however, they attached very 
different moral significance to different sources and types of stem cells. This sometimes 
created situations where the moral status of SCNT embryos was claimed as being sufficient 
to protect them from research, but implied as being less than that of fertilised embryos. In 
the following statement, SCNT embryos are equated as “offspring” but classified as a 
“subclass” of humans: 
To clone is to create a human offspring with no mother -- just an emptied out female egg -- and no 
father, for the donor of DNA is not father to the clone, but its identical twin, and could be as 
anonymous a donor as a piece of human tissue from the laboratory fridge. Cloning creates a subclass 
of humans who are absolute orphans with no mother to defend their interests, mere laboratory 
animals, meat for the consumption of science. [David van Gend] The Herald Sun (Melbourne) 
                                                 
2
 Quotes from the op-eds are transcribed verbatim and attributed to their respective authors. However, interview 
texts have been de-identified and edited according to standards for using verbatim quotations in reporting 
qualitative research (Corden and Sainbury 2006). 
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In this statement, Dr Van Gend, who fronted the “Do No Harm” campaign (established to 
oppose research on human embryos) suggests that the moral status of SCNT embryos is less 
than human because they lack the genetic connectedness of ‘normal’ parental relationships. 
At the same time, he implies that the interests of SCNT embryos should nonetheless be 
protected from “the consumption of science”. This type of rhetoric has been used by 
opponents of ESC/SCNT research elsewhere in appealing to the emotional disposition of 
public audiences (Parry 2003; Williams, Kitzinger, and Henderson 2003). In other opponent’s 
claims, the moral status of human embryos was heightened by contrasting them with 
mature adult stem cells:  
Better still, there is no ethical dilemma about the harvesting of mature stem cells. They come from a 
scrape of your nose, so a human embryo does not have to be destroyed. [Angela Shanahan] Sydney 
Sunday Telegraph 
The enthymeme in Angela Shanahan’s statement implied moral status by assuming that 
there is “no ethical dilemma” in destroying tissues from non-embryonic sources, even 
though research on human tissues is highly regulated and does raise important ethical 
issues relating to privacy and ownership. Along with industrial metaphors of “harvesting” 
stem cells (rather than ‘deriving’ cell lines), these claims were nevertheless likely to carry 
emotional appeal and were generally made in the context of comparing the potential 
medical utility of embryonic and non-embryonic sources of stem cells. They were used to 
argue against SCNT on the grounds that a less morally relevant source of stem cells was 
available and undermine the science supporting ESC research: 
Despite similar misinformation to the contrary, adult stem cell research is a viable and vibrant path 
to new medical therapies. Even calling them an alternative to embryonic stem cells misinforms the 
public. Why? Because embryonic stem cells provide no path at all. [James Sherley] The Australian. 
In the by-line of this op-ed piece, Professor Sherley, a US-based researcher who was in 
Australia during the policy debate, appealed to his credibility as a scientist working with 
adult stem cells to support his claims. While Professor Sherley is a member of an alliance 
with several religious groups who recently filed an injunction in the US District Court against 
President Obama’s changes to federal funding for ESC research (Sherley v. Sebelius [2010] 
DDC 686), in the Australian context, he used only his scientific credentials to establish his 
claims to authority. This is not to accuse him of dishonesty in any way, rather it simply 
reinforces the point that scientific credibility could be seen to secure persuasive access to 
public debate, ahead of any other grounds. In this regard it is noteworthy that those who 
argued for ESC legislation also did not disclose their religious affiliations, their agnosticism 
or their atheism – their claims to scientific validity were of far greater discursive significance.  
Arguments over the ‘plasticity’ or potential clinical utility of different stem cells were an 
important feature of the public discourse surrounding ESC research. Such arguments are 
essentially moral in nature because they appeal to the necessity of using human embryos in 
research. Those used by opponents of ESC research are largely made in response to 
arguments advanced by advocates of this research who claim that it is necessary to pursue 
because ASCs do not offer the same potential in terms of medical and therapeutic benefits. 
A research advocate in this debate provided one such example:  
While adult stem cells do offer the promise of treating some diseases, there is a very widely held 
view among experts in this field that their usefulness may be limited. [Bernie Tuch] The Sydney 
Morning Herald.  
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Credibility for this claim derived both from Professor Tuch’s standing as a stem cell scientist 
and from his assertion that it was the “very widely held view among experts” that ASCs have 
limited use. This statement implied that there is scientific consensus on the relative merits 
of different stem cell sources. Scientific consensus is the combined opinion of experts. 
When used in public discourse, the concept of expert consensus becomes a rhetorical term 
that conveys legitimacy, regardless of whether it represents the ‘truth’. In this context, it 
was likely to have conveyed both trust and authority in the claim that ESC research was 
necessary. 
Similar statements were made by non-scientists who drew on the expertise of others to 
substantiate their arguments. The claims of non-scientists contained comparable normative 
evaluations of human embryos and stem cells, and conveyed similar assumptions about the 
authority of expertise and scientific consensus. These similarities emerged as evidence of 
the discourse alliances that formed between scientists and non-scientists. The use of science 
by those arguing both for and against ESC/SCNT research conveyed meanings that were 
normatively consistent with the overall objectives of each alliance. For example, journalist 
Wayne Crawford drew on science claims to link SCNT embryos with their ethical and social 
value as useful objects that lack moral status:  
As scientists have stressed, therapeutic cloning is not about copying people, but copying cells. It may 
mean eventually that, for example, bone marrow grafts could be made with perfectly 
immunologically matched cells which would, therefore, not run the risk of mismatch and rejection… 
Any human embryo clone created would be purely to extract stem cells -- linking its moral 
significance closely to the research to develop potential treatments for serious medical conditions, 
rather than a potential as human life. [Wayne Crawford] Hobart Mercury. 
These strategies appeal to the scientific ethos and are a discursive means of establishing 
credibility: that is, they allow speakers to convince their audience about their knowledge of 
the technical issues and establish a trust relationship with them (Prelli 1997, 88-89). By 
aligning themselves in this way, the claims made by those opposed to ESC/SCNT on 
technical grounds were invested with meanings that were normatively distinct from those 
used by the advocates of this research. Such distinctions became the dominate narrative 
throughout the debate and were indicative of the ‘rules’ different discourse communities 
have regarding the meaning and use of words such as “stem cells”, “cloning” and “embryos” 
in public discourse. 
Marginalisation of Personal Experiences 
Narratives that fail to fit within either the specialist or critical discourses that surround 
science often struggle to find a voice in public debates around its governance. During the 
Australian debate, people with disease that may, in theory, benefit from ESC/SCNT research, 
some of whom represented patient advocacy groups, were invited to describe the hardship 
of their daily lives and hopes for medical interventions that might arise from stem cell 
research. Their stories were often articulate and moving. Being allowed to speak in public 
about their experiences was a highly personal matter for these participants, whose personal 
feelings and emotions were in need of legitimation. The emotional power of these 
narratives was, however, often resented or devalued by opponents of ESC/SCNT research.  
At times, patients were dismissed by opponents to the policy proposal as having been 
misled into believing there was hope in the potential of ESC/SCNT research: 
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I think they are the classic dupes in all this… they get all the patient groups together and get 
someone in a wheelchair ‘yes we’ll cure you, are you behind us?’, ‘yes, we’re behind you!’. You’ve 
got Parkinsons, you’ve had a stroke and the patient advocate groups will advocate anything that 
gives them hope. And I think that is a misuse of those people personally. [Opponent A] 
As suggested in Professor Sherley’s op-ed, supporters of ESC research were accused of 
making overhyped, exaggerated and misleading claims about the realistic prospects for 
benefits. In an apparent response to these criticisms, many policy advocates were seen 
toning down the language used in their claims about potential benefits. For example, the 
CEO of the Australian Stem Cell Centre at the time of the debate claimed that, “it should be 
understood that cell cloning technology is not a guarantee of a cure” and “at this stage, no 
scientist would guarantee its potential as a cure” (Steven Livesey, Australian Financial 
Review). Indeed, the false hopes being raised by doctors who exploit the vulnerabilities of 
patients in so-called ‘stem cell tourism’ is receiving increasing attention in the scientific and 
bioethical literature as a moral concern (i.e. Murdoch and Scott 2010). However, 
undermining the testimony of patients in the context of a public debate based on 
assumptions about their ability to form rational judgments was described by a patient 
advocate interviewed for this study as offensive:  
They represent people like me as dupes… [like] we are just duped by these cavalry scientists who are 
giving us false hope. That really gives me the willies, because I am an intelligent person and 
everybody I know on this debate is pretty intelligent. We’re not expecting overnight cures. I mean, 
I’m aware that this disease will probably kill me before any therapies are developed, but I never give 
up hope. [Advocate A] 
In this quote, Advocate A has responded to the opponents’ assertions of misguidance as an 
insult to their intelligence. This perceived lack of respect for the patients’ voice in public 
debate is what Little et al (2002, 1081) refer to as “dysempowerment”. Dysempowerment is 
a process whereby an individual interprets an event as an affront to their dignity and in 
ways that debilitates their ability to respond (Kane and Montgomery 1998). In the policy 
arena, this process results in the dysempowered being marginalised to the outer fringes of 
public debate as the more powerful ‘mainstream’ discourses of science, law and politics 
take precedence (Little et al. 2002). Dismissing the hopes held by patients as false is one 
possible means of achieving this: another is to undermine the generalisability of their 
accounts by providing counter-experiences of disease and illness. For example, by claiming 
that not all those who suffer from serious illness supported ESC/SCNT research, as indicated 
in the following quote from an interviewee whose close relative had recently deceased from 
a chronic disease, some opponents were able to assert that the patients’ testimonies were 
either irrelevant or provided only limited insight into the issue:  
Some people think somebody with that sort of background might have a different view and would 
be prepared to support any and all research that may assist people with, you know, Type 1 Diabetes, 
Motor Neurone Disease or like diseases. I guess my philosophy is good science requires good ethics. 
You have to draw a line somewhere. Even somebody such as myself who has so much to gain, 
potentially to gain, or my kids have so much potentially to gain, you've got to draw the line 
somewhere so the question is where do you draw the line on these matters in terms of the ethics. 
[Opponent B] 
The quote from Opponent B implies that the experiences of those suffering from disease and 
illness ought not to have authority in ethical decision making around science policy. Not because 
they have been ‘duped’ – indeed, this opponent appears to acknowledge the potential for 
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benefits – but that their views are not representative. This lack of generalisation, and the 
subjectivity of personal experience, does not fit well with the other, purportedly more, objective 
discourses that sit at the policy table. And so while patients can reveal the most, and know 
best, about what they are experiencing, they do not speak with any authority in 
policymaking contexts as their stories almost invariably disappear from policy documents 
and legislation – they are dysempowered (Little et al. 2002). To establish their legitimacy, 
patients must, therefore, form into organisational groups (as patient advocates) and build 
alliances with other actors who speak on behalf of politically powerful institutions, such as 
science, medicine and the law.  
Individuals are vulnerable when they speak about their personal experiences in the public 
domain, far more so than if they are speaking from a professional or political narrative. They 
are especially vulnerable when they are not institutionally supported or are without a 
discourse that protects them from personal attack. And while personal narratives can touch 
audiences emotionally and engender empathy from others who identify with their 
circumstances, they can also expose people to marginalisation through torment, 
humiliation, persecution and exclusion from other social groups to which they belong.  
One such vulnerable group in the Australian debate were the embryo donors. Women who 
already donate their embryos, or will be called upon to donate their embryos and/or 
oocytes for ESC/SCNT research, play a crucial role in its future. Yet these women are in an 
extremely vulnerable position because they may often have strong emotional attachments 
to their embryos (De Lacey 2005; Haimes et al. 2008). According to an IVF patient 
interviewed in this study, many feel judged for making decisions about the fate of their 
embryos and particularly for speaking about their decisions or beliefs in the public domain. 
I’m a Christian. I’m a member of a Church and… we had to sit and listen to these people, the right-to-
lifers, say that if we were to consider using our stored embryos for research that we were treating 
them like frozen vegetables. Others accused us of treating them as a commodity. Some quite 
callously suggested that they were not surplus but unwanted and the Social Committee of the 
Anglican Church in Sydney said that anyone wishing to donate them into research were treating 
them as a commodity and that our guardianship of them should be withdrawn. [Advocate B] 
Reflecting on the rhetoric employed by some opponents of the policy proposal, Advocate B 
makes explicit references to members of the Church who sought to silence her and other 
former IVF patients from participating in the debate. As she went onto explain, “I am a 
member of the Anglican Church in the Sydney diocese no more… I just pretty much felt an 
outcast there because I felt that I was in error”. The treatment experienced by Advocate B, 
both in the public debate and as a member of this particular Church, and her subsequent 
actions is evidence of what Kane and Montgomery (1998) describe as the outcome of 
dysempowerment: that is, feelings of humiliation, indignation and hostility that that 
ultimately lead to an impairment in trust, motivation and commitment to the discourse 
community in question.  
Patients of IVF programs are members of other discourse communities, which have their 
own rules about what its members can and cannot discuss in public discourse. For members 
who speak in terms that are not accepted within the discourse rules of a particular 
community are required to either modify their views or keep them private, else they risk 
expulsion (Little and Lipworth 2007, 10-11). These sanctions can threaten the identity of 
members because identification is part of the process in which they subscribe to the values, 
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beliefs and ideologies of a discourse community (Gee 1999, 32-34). Thus, when asked why 
more couples from IVF programs do not participate in public policy debates that affect 
decisions concerning their embryos, Advocate B replied that “it is very difficult for people to 
be open because they are afraid that judgments will be made about the way they want to 
have children”. It is arguable, therefore, that fear of retribution and exclusion from other 
communities they are members of, as well as society more generally, has marginalised past 
and potential embryo donors participating as legitimate actors in the public debates around 
stem cell research. More often, their interests are represented by the more powerful and 
established voices of the IVF industry.  
Legitimation of Discourse Communities  
The legitimacy of medical doctors and scientists in science policy contexts is determined by 
norms and processes that draw sharp boundaries around, and assign status to, different 
types of expertise (Jasanoff 2005, 28-29). These boundaries are negotiated between experts 
(Gieryn 1999, 4-5) by drawing on terms that are situated within a preferred discourse (Little, 
Jordens, and Sayers 2003). Hence, in contexts such as stem cell research, scientists draw on 
the specialist discourses of science by providing the ‘hard facts’ and other experts, such as 
bioethicists and theologians draw on the critical discourses of bioethics in normatively 
justifying or refuting the research. However, while very distinct, our analysis of the 
Australian stem cell debate clearly shows how the two discourses are interdependent. 
Throughout the Australian stem cell debate, moral and technical experts negotiated their 
legitimacy by drawing on multiple discourses that crossed into each other’s domain of 
expertise. These processes were observed in the way participants deployed discourses that 
extended beyond the presumed boundaries of their expertise. At times, this fusion of moral 
and technical discourses often made it difficult to tease them apart. It was also indicative of 
how the rhetorical strategies adopted by participants reflected the different understandings 
discourse communities have about the ontology of human embryos, as highlighted in the 
following statement from a stem cell scientist: 
It comes back to the definition of when life begins. If you were to take the view that says life begins 
when an egg and sperm are fertilised, or when an embryo is created by other means, then I 
completely understand that point of view about why you might have difficulties. I personally have 
some problems about giving the same credence to something which is less than the size of full stop 
comma dot or whatever, to put it colloquially. Compared to someone like yourself or myself, 
basically, I find it very difficult to see how you can equate the two together. [Advocate C] 
Several factors emerge to suggest why expert discourses cross into multiple domains. First, 
like everyone else, experts belong to multiple discourse communities and may have 
numerous interests in the outcomes of a policy dispute (Irwin and Michael 2003, 95-97). 
Moral, technical and legal experts can each have simultaneous interests as employees, 
shareholders, parents of sick children and concerned citizens, as well as being professional 
researchers, academics, ministers, lawyers and so on. As they seek influence in public 
debate, experts will thus employ discourses from the domain(s) in which they have power 
(Ganchoff 2004). However, certain discourses may prevail because of priorities that are set 
in the mobilisation of discourse alliances. 
Alliances invariably form between members of discourse communities who share some 
common goal in achieving a particular outcome. Perhaps the most notable alliance that 
arose during the Australian debate was that between the Catholic Church and conservative 
Lysaght, Little & Kerridge (2011), Journal of Bioethical Inquiry. 8(2):191-202. Post-review copy. 
 
12 
sections of the Australian Federal Government at the time, which led directly to the funding 
of research into adult stem cells and the establishment of the National Adult Stem Cell 
Research Centre with non-competitive grants (Dayton 2006). Generally though, these 
alliances tend to be informal and loosely governed by an implicit set of rules that guide the 
types of arguments and claims participants may use in public debate.  
In the Australian debate, informal alliances formed between scientists, patient advocates 
and other political supporters of stem cell research. This alliance primarily concerned itself 
with establishing and defending the technical viability of ESC/SCNT research. This strategy 
not only reinforced the ‘genuine’ potential of this research but also shifted attention away 
from the moral issues concerning the embryo by forcing opponents to respond to these 
technical issues and deny its potential utility. In the interview with Opponent C, the 
technical issues were seconded to the moral questions central to the opponent’s position: 
That’s the heart of it. That it is wrong as it was unanimously felt to be in 2002 and remains so now. If 
that is wrong, then even if there are unique benefits to be gained scientifically from cloning that is 
too bad because it is an ethical aisle that cannot be crossed no matter how attractive the prospects 
are on the other side of that line. We simply have to find other ways as we are as we are, beautifully, 
with adult stem cell science. We need to find other ways to obtain those good goals. And therefore 
the scientific question is almost irrelevant. At the very best it is strictly secondary. [Opponent C] 
As explained below by Opponent D, a Sydney religious identity, opponents felt they had to 
respond to claims the advocates made about the comparable utility of ESC and ASC research 
because the debate had focused on its potential benefits. Commitments to other moral 
imperatives did not allow them to acknowledge that benefits might potentially be gained 
from research on ESCs and SCNT: 
The question isn’t which one of these two will engage in therapy because there is a fundamental 
question behind one of them that doesn’t allow me to say that embryo research is a good way to go, 
whether it will benefit or not. So, at that level it is not relevant. It is relevant in the sense that if you 
are claiming something, if you’re claiming a lot for something, then you need to be able to at least 
make a good case as to why you are claiming so much. [Opponent D] 
As SCNT is now permitted in most parts of Australia, this counter-strategy was unsuccessful 
in preventing the laws governing ESC/SCNT research from being relaxed for several reasons. 
First, it gave research advocates space to justify their case, which diverted the public’s gaze 
from the opponent’s main concern – the welfare of human embryos (Lynch 2009). Its 
efficacy was also weakened by the emphasis given to technological solutions in Australia’s 
science policymaking context (Harvey 2008). Ultimately, however, the objections to 
ESC/SCNT research were ineffectual because issues that are framed as technical questions 
do not generate moral solutions (Jasanoff 2005, 195). Legitimacy in this debate was, 
therefore, contingent upon the participants who were able to access the debate, put 
forward their arguments and respond to the claims of others through their various social 
networks and allegiances. 
The personal experiences of women and patients were marginalised in this debate by the 
alliances that formed between more powerful discourse communities. Members of these 
communities established legitimacy and asserted authority by discursively deploying science 
in claims that legitimated expert discourses while marginalising other types of 
epistemologies. The public debates surrounding stem cell research have thus come to be 
dominated by consideration of a relatively narrow range of arguments and issues to the 
Lysaght, Little & Kerridge (2011), Journal of Bioethical Inquiry. 8(2):191-202. Post-review copy. 
 
13 
exclusion of other concerns that may be held by broader sections of the community who 
either do not or are unable to align themselves with institutionally-accredited discourse 
communities.  
Conclusion 
Examination of the debate around ESC/SCNT legislation in Australia found that participants 
in these debates use science claims rhetorically as a means of achieving a desired moral 
outcome and deploy them strategically as a source of authority and legitimation. Generally 
speaking, those opposed to the liberalisation of Australia’s stem cell policy used science 
claims to state their opposition in terms of the immorality of creating and destroying human 
embryos for research purposes; while supporters of this policy proposal used science claims 
to position their arguments within the ethical framework of medicine and the moral good of 
pursuing outcomes associated with medical beneficence. The preferential use of science 
claims implied that the status attached to scientific knowledge was weightier than other 
epistemologies and that the personal narratives and stories of those most likely to be 
affected by the outcomes of the policy episode were relatively marginalised. 
The terms participants use in public discourse, and the context in which they choose to 
speak, reflect not only their value preferences, but their membership of particular discourse 
communities. When participants speak ‘out of turn’ or in ways that conflict with the overall 
commitments of the communities to which they belong, their authority may be eroded and 
they may become marginalised. While such outcomes seem severe for individuals, they may 
be an inevitable consequence of attempts to force public discourse into domains where 
particular participants have dominant legitimacy and authority. These domains are 
represented in the stem cell debates by the expert communities that make up the specialist 
discourses of science and the critical discourses of bioethics. 
The dominance of discourse alliances between Judeo-Christian religious groups, biomedical 
researchers, academic bioethicists, and the biotechnology industry, not only explains the 
observed uniformity in the global stem cell policy debates: it accounts for the 
dysempowerment of patients and women’s groups. The dominant discourses within these 
alliances are institutionally-accredited and influence the public debate by generating the 
discursive resources that convey a unified message with a limited set of policy options. 
These resources are adopted by other, less powerful groups to gain legitimacy and 
reflexively influence the terms and framing of the debate. While this process provides 
access for groups who lack institutional legitimacy, it also entails a delegitimation of 
ambiguous meanings and conflicting values. Alternative viewpoints and positions are 
systematically marginalised by the institutions that compete for authority over the 
legitimation process, and whose interests are best served, by limiting participation to those 
who share similar values and ideals. As such, public debate around science policy is more 
likely to reflect the normative preferences of the prevailing social structures that control the 
legitimation process rather than the needs of those likely to be most affected by its 
outcomes. 
More enriched and inclusive public debates about the governance of stem cell research may 
be encouraged by shifting focus away from the outcomes of particular policy decisions and 
onto the processes by which participants and their arguments are legitimated. These 
processes are moral, political and rhetorical, and operate in empirical and contextual 
practice. Science has an important role to play in these processes, not as means of silencing 
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others from discussion, but to explore possible meanings and novel solutions to policy 
problems. The point is not to win the debate at all costs, but to clarify and deepen our 
understandings of science and its social, moral and political implications. 
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